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MILITARY AFFAIRS

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CONTENTS	PAGE
Development of Soviet Naval Base System Discussed (Ludwig Stoll; SOLDAT UND TECHNIK, Aug 79)	1
Soviet View on Modern Status of Capitalism Aired (V. Strigachev; KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, Sep 79)	12
Laxity in Admission to Communist Party Membership Criticized (V. Soshnev; KOMMUN. I VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, Sep 79)	19
Points for Lecture on Military Discipline Outlined (KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, Sep 79)	28
Wartime Role of Submarines Discussed (K. Stalbo; MORSKOY SBORNIK, Sep 79)	34

DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET NAVAL BASE SYSTEM DISCUSSED

Frankfurt/Main SOLDAT UND TECHNIK in German No 8, Aug 79 pp 412-417

[Article by Commander Ludwig Stoll: "Soviet Sea Power and Naval Base Policy"]

[Text] For years we have been observing the consistent expansion of the Soviet Navy and have regularly presented to our readers all the technical information accessible to us regarding the Soviet Navy. The Baltic Sea area, the Mediterranean, the near Atlantic and the North Sea are the areas in which NATO is being directly affected by Soviet naval activities. In the same way as the Army and Air Force armament of the Kremlin, those activities go far beyond the normal security requirements of the Soviet Union. Since Western Europe must not fall into the error of estimating the Soviet threats exclusively from the land aspects, one must keep calling to mind that NATO is an alliance of sea powers whose existence depends on the possibilities of free movement on the world oceans. Any efforts toward an objective evaluation of the overall military and political situation makes a summary of the present situation created by the Soviet impetus toward expansion necessary. An awareness of it is the basis for understanding the regular technical reports and accounts of our periodical on modern Soviet warship construction. With the following article by an author known to our readers through a number of publications in SOLDAT UND TECHNIK, we are at the same time satisfying the desire of a number of our friends for a precise presentation of Soviet fleet activities from their beginnings to the very recent present.

We also refer to this present article on pages 426-429 of this issue.

"The Soviet Union has no overseas naval bases at all and she is not striving to acquire any, since plans of conquest of any kind are alien to her."

This sentence was spoken not by just any Soviet or pro-Soviet propagandist but by no one less than Fleet Admiral Sergey Gorsbkov, the commander in chief of the Soviet Navy, in an article appearing in the military journal TYL I SNABZHENIYE (Rear Service and Supply). Doubtlessly the admiral against his better judgment had to make a concession to propaganda, an obligation which in the USSR is apparently imposed on writers of even quite unpolitical publications. For the reader in the Western world familiar with maritime development the Agit-prop statement acts like a spur and stimulates him to a comparison with reality.¹ The question arises as to how it applies to the Soviet Union actually in the non-intervention into the affairs of foreign countries and in the use of overseas military bases. In connection with the growth of the USSR into a super seapower an investigation must be made of how the Soviet Union has developed her coastal base and her fleet bases as important cornerstones of maritime power. Of interest here is not only the acquiring of bases overseas, but the overall development since the founding of the Soviet Union. Much has been said and written just recently about Soviet efforts to acquire fleet bases throughout the world. For a better understanding of this policy however it is necessary to consider this problem not only historically but in its technical aspects. Finally, the methods must be analyzed which lead to the gaining of bases. This study is to be limited to Soviet naval bases, despite the fact that naval air forces and therefore air bases are necessary for maintaining the operational freedom of a fleet. First, however, the term "fleet base" calls for clarification and/or an attempt at an explanation.

Definition of the Term "Fleet Base"

In the Soviet version the fact of using foreign bases is interpreted in such a way that the Soviet warships are calling at ports in friendly countries from time to time on friendly visits and to replenish supplies and at the same time crews also have an opportunity to go ashore. According to this theory, the Gorshkov statement cited at the beginning rings true. But actually the term "fleet base" cannot be defined one hundred percent. In the reference works and yearbooks of the prewar period and from the time of the Second World War (e.g., "Nauticus") a distinction was still being made between first-class and second-class bases, wherein the criterion for assignment as a first-class base was the presence of high-capacity repair capabilities for even large ships. Taking into account all the technical demands, the ideal fleet base--a giant naval base like Norfolk or San Diego perhaps comes to mind--satisfies the following requirements:

- Sheltered wharves and anchorages (independent of tide as much as possible) with connections for electricity, fresh water, steam, condensate, and, as far as possible, a fuel replenishment capability at the wharf;
- Handling capability for supplies of all kinds, including ammunition;
- Repair capabilities for all shipboard installations, also possibility of drydocking;

--Telecommunications connections;

--Installations for housing/quarters, and for medical care of crews.

The course of the Second World War, however, brought the knowledge of the mobility of modern fleets and their extensive dependence on bases. The Americans, for example, in their wide-ranging operations in the Pacific were not able to rely only on distant Pearl Harbor and other well-developed bases, but frequently had to operate from makeshift advanced naval bases in their island hopping. Repair, hospital, and other supply ships were stationed in sheltered bays, and combatants were provided with the most urgent rear services here.

Even the most urgent repairs, e.g., of minor combat damage, were able to be performed here. In that way the fleet remained operational, although many a combatant was unable to return to home port or enter a shipyard for years. After the Second World War finally mobile replenishment of sea became a matter of course for many navies and their dependence on bases therefore became greater. Since also the technology of the supply services has progressed, it can be said that a temporary naval base can be set up today with a substantially smaller expenditure for the infrastructure than perhaps a military airfield for modern jet aircraft. First of all a protected anchorage is necessary which can also be easily protected militarily. Then only the needed supply and replenishment ships need to be transferred and anchored. Floating electric power plants and floating cranes can complete this service and supply echelon of auxiliaries.

In consideration of these technical capabilities given today, the term "fleet base" must therefore be understood considerably more broadly than it has usually been heretofore and is apparently being represented outwardly by the Soviets. Even with a broad interpretation of the term it is still difficult to distinguish between ports which can be entered only occasionally for replenishment purposes and those which must be regarded as falling under the category--even if only temporarily--of developed naval bases.

The Historical Development of the Soviet Base System

In the historical consideration of the development which the Soviet Union has undergone in her sixty-year history, first a widely held error must be dispelled. It says that the Soviet Union did not recognize the significance of sea power until Gorshkov assumed command in 1956 and that only from that point on did she decide to build up an oceanic navy. In a good number of publications one gets the idea that until about 1956 the Soviet command visualized the development of a fleet suited for coastal defense. Actually, Soviet naval forces can be designated as purely defensive only in their early beginnings. As early as 1935 there came into being with the express approval of Stalin an ambitious plan for building up a high seas fleet which eclipsed the German Z-plan and included 16 battleships among others. The biggest handicap to building sea power was the then extremely unfavorable naval strategic position of Russia. Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov

therefore in a talk with Hitler in Berlin in November 1940 demanded that the German Government recognize the Turkish Straits as an area of Soviet interest. That demand represents an especially aggressive act of typical sea power and naval base policy and is to be understood from the aspiration already existing toward better access into the world's oceans. The Soviet Government had in all frankness returned to the goals of the old Czarist power politics. Hand in hand with the planned expansion of the fleet--which the Second World War abruptly interrupted--went the effort to broaden the base system and to create a broader fleet base. That policy can be divided into the following phases:

--Phase 1: The period of restoration and at the same time of expansion in Europe (1940-45), that is, the regaining of the territories and bases lost in 1905 and 1918 and the Soviet expansion as a result of the Second World War.

--Phase 2: The period of gaining a foothold and of penetration into the Mediterranean and exercise of influence in the Near East (since 1958).

--Phase 3: The period of strengthening of Soviet sea power and of maritime imperialism, that is world-wide expansion by acquisition of bases in Third World countries (since about 1970).

Phase I: Restoration and Expansion Until 1945

After revolution and civil war Soviet Russia around 1922 was in a catastrophic situation. Just as her industry and economy were stagnating, so, too, were the remnants of the formerly Czarist fleet in a desolate situation. This was true not only for the personnel and material, but also for the remaining coastal base. After heavy territorial losses Russia was at a low point in this regard also (Fig. 1): in the Far East the southern part of Sakhalin Island and Port Arthur were lost in 1905 as a result of the war with Japan. On the Baltic Sea coast the Soviet base was compressed into a narrow coastal strip around Leningrad after 1918. Just 25 km off this city began the international boundary with independent Finland. Also the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania had won independence at Russia's expense. Thus in the early building phase the Soviet Baltic fleet was able to be based only in Leningrad-Kronstadt. In the other fleet areas there remained as main bases Murmansk in the North Sea, Sevastopol in the Black Sea, and Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk in the Pacific.

Only the German-Soviet Friendship Treaty of August 1939--which has gone down in history as the Hitler-Stalin Pact--and the successful outcome of the Second World War for the Soviet Union created possibilities for expansion and most importantly opened the door to the West (Fig. 2). The Winter War against Finland (1939-40) brought the Soviet Union territorial gains on Fischer (Rybachiy) Island in the north, in central Finland and in Karelia. After the conclusion of a peace in 1944, still harder conditions were imposed on the Finns. Now the naval base of Petsamo (Pechenga) and the important industrial and port city of Viipuri (Vyborg) were annexed to the Soviet territory, and the naval base of Porkkala had to be made available temporarily to the Soviet fleet.

The Hitler-Stalin Pact also gave the Russians a free hand to annex the Baltic states in the summer of 1940. Thus the port cities of Riga, Reval, and Li'au were again in Russian hands, as were the less important naval bases of Baltischport, Werder, Loksa, Windau, and Duenamuende. The Allied victory in 1945 bestowed upon the USSR an expanse on the Baltic Sea coast of never before suspected scope: Memel, Pillau and Koenigsberg fell to the Soviets, Gdingen again became a Polish naval base, and Swinemuende came under Polish administration. Those bases of the newly emerging Polish Navy were just as open to the Soviet fleet as the seaports in the part of Germany declared to be the Soviet Zone of Occupation. Thus the sea power of the Soviet Union which was formerly limited to the innermost corner of the Gulf of Finland had become the most important one adjacent to the Baltic Sea and had extended its orbit up to shortly off Luebeck.

In the Far East also the naval strategic situation changed considerably in the Soviet Union's favor (Fig. 3) in 1945. Japan was eliminated as a sea power and had to return the Japanese southern half of Sakhalin Island which she had held since 1905. Otomari (Korsakov) and Shikoda (Poronaisk) became Soviet fleet bases.² The Kuriles were ceded as a strategically especially important group of islands to the USSR. The Japanese have never recovered from that loss and even now are demanding the return of those islands by the Soviets as a sign of good will.

All in all therefore the year 1945 moved the Soviet Union a long way forward also in her aspirations for sea power. Not only were territorial losses from earlier wars of the Czarist Empire restored, but an additional broad coastal base was won. There was little change in the situation of the original naval strategic predicament of Russia--control of the Danish and the Turkish Straits in foreign hands and no direct access to the Atlantic except from the North Sea.

Phase 2: Penetration Into the Mediterranean and Exercise of Influence in the Near East Since 1958

Relatively early in the years of the Cold War the Soviets were gradually penetrating into the Mediterranean (Fig.4). The regular presence of the 6th U.S. Fleet provided the excuse for them to dispatch naval forces into the Mediterranean. The history of Soviet base policy in the Mediterranean area is especially interesting, since it exhibits regular ups and downs, a succession of alternating successes and failures. The Soviet presence consisted at first of submarines, for which friendly and Communist-controlled Albania opened the port of Valona as a base. This episode lasted from 1958 to 1961 and came to an end when Soviet-Chinese relations were broken off and Albania sided with China. Afterward the Albanian-Chinese friendship was also renounced, and it remains to be seen whether or not there will be a rapprochement between Tirana and Moscow.

The Near East was also very soon included in the base policy of the USSR. Her clear support of the cause of the Arabs and against Israel made the Arab states susceptible to Soviet propaganda and compliant with respect to Soviet desires for bases. Especially valuable to the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron

(eskadra) which had grown to over 50 ship units in the meantime, were the Egyptian ports of Marsa Matruh, Port Said, and Alexandria, the last especially on account of its well developed El-Gabbari Shipyard with docking also for large ships. The rapprochement of Egypt and the West brought with it the final renunciation of Soviet use rights. This "booting out" was certainly the hardest setback which Soviet base policy has had to sustain until then. The squadron must now restrict itself to using the less valuable bases of Latakia and Tartus in Syria; Tobruk in Libya is supposed to be developed as a base. Anchorages are frequently sought out in the Gulf of Mammamet and in the Aegean in international waters. According to what has been said so far about the mobility and the base-dependence of modern fleets, this would have to be enough just for the logistics of the squadron. Steps taken by the Soviets in the past however lead to the conclusion that they are not satisfied with this situation and will initiate further base-associated activities.

One of their targets, now as before, is probably Malta (see also No. 2/79, p. 96), the "unsinkable aircraft carrier" of Great Britain in the Mediterranean in the Second World War, constantly attacked by the German and Italian air forces but never subdued. Malta's Prime Minister Dom Mintoff has followed a remarkable seesaw policy since the island state gained its independence, first giving the cold shoulder to Soviet offers, having the port facilities restored with the help of German experts, and then permitting Great Britain to continue stationing troops for a large payment. After the withdrawal of the British garrison in the spring of 1979 Mintoff declared NATO an enemy of Malta and befriended Libya's head of state Qadhafi. Malta since then has been receiving financial aid from oil-producing Libya and has practically become her outpost in the Mediterranean. NATO can regard this development with only the greatest concern. The danger that the Russians will finally emerge from behind the unfathomable and unpredictable Qadhafi and assume rights in La Valetta cannot be denied.

Yugoslavia, too, is a special problem. She broke officially with the Soviet Union in 1949 and since then has been exposed to constant pressure from Moscow and has stubbornly refused to grant the squadron rights to Kotor (Cattaro) Bay. Still, Yugoslavia in 1974 permitted the USSR use of certain shipyards by warships (see also No. 2/77, pp. 84-85). How the relations between the two states will develop in the post-Tito era is a completely open matter.

Phase 3: Strengthening of Soviet Sea Power and Maritime Imperialism Since About 1970

Parallel to the enormous growth in Soviet naval hardware in recent years was an ever increasingly perceptible effort to expand her sea power into the Indian, Atlantic, and Pacific Oceans, jointly with the effort to acquire base rights in Third World countries. If the regaining of lost territories and the expansion on the Baltic Sea served Soviet interests directly right at their front door, so to speak, then her entry into the Mediterranean could certainly not be justified any longer by the defense of her own coast. The irony of history is that this phase of development coincides in time with that sector of postwar policy which is described as "detente".

When the Americans reported the development of Diego Garcia Island in the Indian Ocean as a fleet base, it was met with indignation in an orchestrated reaction in Soviet Bloc countries. But not a word was uttered about the fact that the Soviets had long established a foothold in that ocean. Figs. 5 and 6 show that situation and possible future developments in the Atlantic also. By way of explanation let us add that only those countries were displaced as "pro-Soviet" which consistently followed the policy line of Moscow and provide bases to the Soviets. Actually the line between "pro-Soviet" and "non-pro-Soviet" is hard to draw sharply in Africa, since a number of states receive economic and/or military aid from the USSR and have become dependent on her in varying degrees.

In the Red Sea the Soviets can use the Port of Massaua, in South Yemen the bases of Muskalla and Aden. East German combat engineers of the National People's Army were detailed to develop the port in Massaua. A drydock for cruisers and destroyers is supposed to come into being there. On the Persian Gulf the Port of Umm Qasr in Iraq is a Soviet base, although in no strategically favorable position. A new question has been raised by the Iranian revolution in this critical area and has been raised by the Iranian revolution in this critical area and an especially threatening situation has quite possibly emerged for the West. The development in Iran since the transition to a republic cannot be foreseen. If the Soviets should prove to be the beneficiaries of the revolution, the oil port of Abadan and the naval base of Bandar Abbas on the Strait of Hormuz would fall into their hands. After the establishment of a pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf as the direction of thrust of Soviet policy is clearly evident anyway.

The Soviet Union had to take setbacks in Somalia. With this country's turn toward the West, use of the port in Berbera and Mogadishu came to nought. Instead the Russians gained a foothold in Mozambique. There Bazaruto and Beira were developed as Soviet bases. The Soviets also established themselves on the Island of Sokotra as well as in the Port of Victoria in the Seychelles. The situation is promising for them on Mauritius and the Maldives (see also No. 2/77, p. 681). They can use the facilities in the Indian port of Vishakhapatnam on a commercial basis.

An ominous situation is clearly discernible possibly in South Africa. Rumors will not die away to the effect that secret negotiations have been held between the South African Government and high KGB officials. According to them the Russians are said to have agreed to tolerate a white Boer republic if air bases and the military port of Simonstown were to be made available to them. If South Africa, abandoned by the West, should have to agree to those offers out of self-preservation, a catastrophic situation would result for Western shipping at the Cape.

The USSR had successes also in the Far East. In Singapore the highly-developed repair yards there are probably in demand at least by merchant ships, which in turn means relief for the domestic shipbuilding industry. In Vietnam well developed U.S. bases fell into communist hands after the American withdrawal,

including Cam Ranh Bay. Thus there came into existence a new Soviet fleet base which complements those already existing in the Pacific. In the Pacific the Soviets attempted in 1976 to gain a foothold on Tonga Island. However, the King of that island kingdom balked openly at ties with the USSR.

Reports on Soviet activities in the Kuriles are cause for concern. It has become known that major troop movements have taken place on the islands of Etorofu and Kunaashiro. According to Japanese sources, these islands are said to be serving as a submarine base.

A no less ominous development is looming in the Atlantic, since the Soviets began in 1974 to set up housekeeping in the Cuban port of Cianguuegos and set up a submarine base there. On African soil they succeeded in establishing a fleet base in Conakry. The Congolese port of Pointe Noire has become known as a transshipment port for Soviet supplies; it may possibly be upgraded into a fleet base in the meantime. This holds true in even greater measure for Luanda, the main port of Angola. Soviet activities are to be expected also on the Island of Sao Tome and on the Cape Verde Islands. Since their release from the Portuguese Union they have been a "people's democracy." Presumably their defense minister requested NVA assistance in developing military and naval installations, while on a visit to East Berlin. Of very great interest to Soviet fleet units is likely the naval base established on Fernando Poo Island (now Macias Nguema) which belongs to Equatorial Guinea. The Soviets have anchored their only floating dock stationed in West Africa in the natural harbor of San Carlos (now Luba).

When the Soviet Government tried some years ago to acquire port rights for her fishing vessels in the Portuguese port of Figueira da Foz, Western naval experts sat up and took notice. It is easy to imagine what would have happened if the Portuguese revolution of 1974 had led to a communist victory. Portugal would have left NATO and its Atlantic ports fallen prize to the Soviets.

Methods of Soviet Naval Base Policy

Just as the goals of Soviet base policy were being set on an ever broader scale, so, too, have the methods been refined and differentiated. For the first phase of this policy conquest by war and/or annexation of foreign territory sufficed. With the postwar development, however, refined methods became necessary. The following measures and steps have been discerned up to now:

--The simplest possibility is the exploitation of a revolution or a civil war in the targeted country. Whether plotted by the Soviets or not, whether stemming from political or religious motives, revolutionary development in the final analysis brings the communists to the helm and opens the door to the Soviet Union. Vietnam and Angola are disturbing examples of that possibility.

--Economically weak countries of the Third World receive economic and military assistance and are, thereby, made dependent, at least where training, logistics, and material maintenance for the weapon systems supplied are concerned. The slowness of Western industrial nations to recognize such a danger works to the advantage of the Soviet "developers." A glance at the table of existing weapons assistance agreements in "The Military Balance" of the International Institute for Strategic Studies reveals that for example Libya and India are receiving warships from the USSR, in addition to the supplies of Western arms. To break this dependence, as for example Egypt dared to do, is very difficult and requires considerable technical adjustments, which in turn are possible only with Western help.

--They acquire port rights (e.g., Yugoslavia) and therefore already have a foot in the door.

--The victory of a communist or a Marxist party in democratic elections establishes favorable conditions. During the election in Mauritius in 1976 two Soviet cruisers were standing in the waters off that island in order to set ashore the necessary experts right after an election with an outcome favorable to them.

--Frequently the first step in establishing base rights is the acquisition of port rights for fishing vessels. The first "friendship visit" of a Soviet warship is then not long in coming.

--Often the base policy is introduced by the conclusion of commercial treaties as well as by establishing consulates and commercial representations. In La Valetta on Malta there is already a Soviet trade office and an Aeroflot travel agency, as SOLDAT UND TECHNIK has reported.

In summary it can be said that the expansion of the navy and the merchant fleet and also that of the Soviet base system is being accomplished consistently and that no opportunity is being missed to establish a foothold abroad. Reality therefore appears to be quite different from what is described by Admiral Gorshkov. The fact that in the age of long-range weapons of annihilation fleet bases are just as threatened as other fixed targets underscores the thesis that it is not the well-developed base which is the best foundation in the usual sense, but the temporary and movable ones equipped with mobile means. The Soviet Union has taken that development into account by building up her replenishment fleet. In peacetime however every naval base has the function of a lever and--in a favorable strategic position--of a thorn in the side of a potential enemy. We must give credit to the Soviets for conducting an extremely skillful and far-sighted policy in that respect. They must expect setbacks to the degree that their treaty partners are "unreliable customers." The concerted actions of the Russians is characterized no more appropriately than by the statement of Winston Churchill about his former allies:

"They will bang and rattle at every door and window until they find one which they can open. And then they will invite themselves to dinner."

FOOTNOTES

1. On this subject see the article Flottenadmiral Gorshkov [Fleet Admiral Gorshkov] in No 8/76 and Die Sowjetflotte heute [The Soviet Fleet Today] in No 7/77.
2. Port Arthur was temporarily made available to the Russians again.

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CAPTIONS

Pages 412-413

Fig. 1 The territory of the USSR after the Civil War

Page 414

Fig. 2 Soviet expansion on the Baltic Sea and the North Sea 1940-45

Fig. 3 Soviet territorial gains in the Far East in 1945 at Japan's expense.

Page 415

Fig. 4 Soviet penetration in the eastern Mediterranean

Fig. 5 The Soviets in the Indian Ocean

Fig. 6 The Soviets in the Atlantic

CSO: 1826

SOVIET VIEW ON MODERN STATUS OF CAPITALISM AIRED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 18, Sep 79 signed to press 4 Sep 79 pp 9-20

[Article by V. Strigachev, doctor of economic sciences and professor: "Revolutionary Renovation of the World Is the Historic Verdict for Capitalism*"; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Excerpts] The revolutionary renovation of the world that was started by the Great October and is being continued before our very eyes confirms convincingly the correctness of Marxism-Leninism and its strategic predictions. Imperialism has irreversibly lost power over most of mankind. Practical socialism and its class allies determine the main content, the main direction and the main features of world development nowadays. "We are going toward an epoch," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in a report about the 60th anniversary of the October Revolution, "when socialism in some concrete, historically determined form or another will become the predominating social system on earth, bearing with it peace, freedom, equality and prosperity for all toiling mankind."

Social upheavals are maturing in the bowels of the old society, which is on its way to its last days and to destruction. The doctrine of capitalism's social crisis is spelled out in a theoretical generalization of the processes of a sharpening of capitalism's internal contradictions, of the prerequisites for its inevitable revolutionary overthrow, and of the growing influence of the countries of victorious socialism on the course of world events. The essence of this crisis, its characteristic features and the dialectics of its development were revealed in V. I. Lenin's works and in the program documents of the CPSU and of the international communist movement.

* * *

Our epoch, whose beginnings were laid by the Great October, has gone on for about 62 years. Capitalism's social crisis has been going on just as long. It will be ended with the destruction of the last exploitive social order.

*It is recommended that the article be used in officers' Marxist-Leninist training groups during study of the topic, "Modern Capitalism and the Further Intensification of Its Social Crisis."

But it stands to reason that it is impossible to forecast the dates of socialist revolutions for each of the imperialist countries. "We count on the inevitability of the international revolution but this does not at all mean," emphasized V. I. Lenin, "that we, like fools, are counting on the inevitability of the revolution within a /definite/ brief period" (Poln. sobr. soch. [Complete Collected Works], Vol 37, p 64).

It is up to the peoples of the capitalist countries themselves to decide their own fate. It is obvious, however, that the process under which the objective and subjective prerequisites for socialist overthrows come to a head will be greatly speeded up under the revolutionizing influence of the successes of practical socialism, as well as an effect of economic disorder, severe social conflicts, and a political-ideology crisis which, developing in breadth and depth, will embrace all aspects of life of bourgeois society.

The pace of social progress is steadily accelerating. While capitalism required four centuries to tread the path from its birth to its decline, a few decades have sufficed for the emergence and consolidation of the world socialist system.

History has brought capitalism the final verdict. The world revolutionary process is carrying it out.

Recommendations for the Seminar Lesson

A seminar lesson on the topic, /"The CPSU on the Deepening of Capitalism's Social Crisis and Intensification of Imperialism's Aggressiveness in the Modern Era,"/ is employed to help our military personnel to explain the causes of the epoch-making doom of the last exploitive social order and the economic and political prerequisites for its inevitable downfall. At the same time it is important to consider that imperialism still has at its disposal no few reserves and is trying to solve its internal contradictions by way of arms races and by preparation for and the unleashing of aggressive wars. This requires constant vigilance on the part of the Soviet people and its soldiers and all peace-loving forces.

During the lesson the following questions should be examined: 1. The 25th CPSU Congress on the deepening of capitalism's social crisis and intensification of economic instability in the world capitalist economy. 2. The arms race and the militarization of the capitalist economy in the modern era. 3. The sharpening of social and political problems in the capitalist countries. 4. The aggressive nature of imperialism's political strategy. The CPSU's practical activity to strengthen international security and to develop comprehensive collaboration of the fraternal socialist states.

It is desirable to start the seminar with a reading by one of the listeners of the paper, "Modern Militarism and the Deepening of Capitalism's Social Crisis."

In examining the /first question/ it is important to assimilate Marxism-Leninism's original statements on the essence and basic features of capitalism's social crisis. This crisis is, V. I. Lenin noted, a period of the "failure of capitalism on a system-wide scale and the birth of a socialist society" (Poln. sobr. soch., Vol 36, p 48).

Since the time of the Great October Socialist Revolution, and later, with the emergence and consolidation of the world socialist system, capitalism's situation cannot be determined by its internal processes alone. The progressive change in the ratio of forces in favor of socialism to the detriment of capitalism is a most important objective law of capitalism's social crisis.

The 25th CPSU Congress confirmed the conclusion of the 24th congress of our party that capitalism's social crisis continues to deepen. Radical social changes that are occurring in the world testify to this: a consolidation of the position of real socialism, victories of national liberation movements, growth in the class struggle of the workers against the oppression of the monopolies, and the ever-increasing scale of the democratic-revolutionary and anti-imperialist movement.

The narrowing of imperialism's sphere of domination compels it to adapt itself to new conditions, to search for stimuli for economic growth. However, this does not lead to the stabilization of capitalism as a system. The increasing intensification of the antagonistic contradictions of the economy is a constant trend in capitalism that shows itself in periodic production slumps. In this sense, the economic crisis of 1974-1975 is extremely typical. It spread simultaneously to all the basic centers of the world capitalist economy, and it hit the highly developed state-monopolistic economies that have prevailed in the postwar period. A sharp reduction in production was accompanied by the appearance of such phenomena as an international currency crisis and energy, raw-materials, foodstuffs and ecological crises. Rivalry within imperialism and discord in the Common Market and within NATO intensified. The competitive struggle became still more merciless.

Now, said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in the Central Committee's Accountability Report to the 25th party congress, everyone sees: one of the chief myths created by reformist and bourgeois ideologues--the myth that the capitalism of our day is able to avoid crises--has been disproved. The instability of capitalism is becoming increasingly obvious. Promises to improve capitalism and to create within its framework a "society for universal prosperity" has suffered an obvious failure (see "Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS" [Papers of the 25th CPSU Congress], p 28).

In discussing the /second question/ attention should be focused on explaining the direct tie that exists between the deepening of capitalism's social crisis, and the intensification of the arms race in the capitalist world and the militarization of the economically advanced imperialist powers.

"Modern militarism," wrote V. I. Lenin in 1908, "is the result of capitalism. It is a 'vital manifestation' of capitalism in both its forms: as the military force that capitalist states require for their external collisions...and as the weapon that serves in the hands of the ruling classes for suppressing every kind of proletarian movement (economic or political)...(Poln. sobr. soch., Vol 17, p 187).

At the social-crisis stage the militarization process of capitalist countries has received a new push and a new purposefulness--against socialism, and against revolutionary liberation movements. The bosses of the imperialist states assume that it is possible to obliterate or at least call a halt to the historical shifts in the world arena that are irreversible in nature with force of arms. Thus, militarism, which today is reaching an unprecedented scale, pretends to the role of the savior of capitalism from its final crash.

The so-called military-industrial complex emerges in imperialist states as the bulwark of reaction and the main moving force for the arms race. It joins the manufacturers of arms, conservative parliamentarians, representatives of the military bosses, scientists and subordinates of the various agencies that service the military business, rightist trade-union leaders and venal journalists--in brief, all those who profit from the armaments trade and from the policy of aggravating the international situation and undermining a lessening of tensions.

The military-industrial monopolists receive fabulous profits, which are severalfold higher than in peaceful industries. V. I. Lenin emphasized that a capitalist who "works" for defense "is working" /on order/ for the public purse, frequently even on the basis of money obtained by him in loans from the public purse (see Poln. sobr. soch., Vol 32, p 319). In the modern era the scale of this "legalized embezzlement of public funds" has assumed gigantic proportions. In setting the mechanism of military economics in motion, the bourgeois state provides the monopolies a vast sphere for capital investment, it finances military-industry corporations, it supplies them with scarce raw materials, it purchases their products at higher prices, and so on.

Apologists for militarism try to assert that a permanent arms race strengthens peace and the security of the state and exerts a salutary influence on the economic situation, scientific and technical progress and employment of the people. However, this contradicts the actual reality. Notwithstanding the stimulation of military production, economic crises continue to shake the capitalist world with a special severity that adds to inflation, which is heated up by the constantly growing military expenditures.

In examining the /third question/ it must be stressed that the aggravation of social and political problems in the nonsocialist world is primarily a consequence of the deepening contradiction between the social nature of production and the capitalism form of appropriating its results. The statements of bourgeois ideologues to the effect that economic growth based upon scientific and technical progress will lead to a reduction of social

inequality and to a reduction in the income gap have proved to be groundless. Suffice it to say that in England 75 percent of all the personal wealth belongs to 5 percent of the population. In France the level of income of the richest families is 80 times the wage of blue-collar and white-collar workers. The profits of American corporations in the last year alone rose by 25 percent, while the "ceiling" on raises in wages was set at 7 percent, which, moreover, inflation constantly eats up.

The use of the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution and capitalist rationalization of production is accompanied by an intensification of exploitation of the working class and of all workers. Unemployment grows. Unlike in the past, it has now embraced practically all categories of the population, and it strikes youth with special force. Along with the rise in unemployment, the increase in prices has become a chronic social calamity. The situation of those who exist on allowances or pensions has become especially difficult: the overwhelming majority of them live at the edge of or beyond the poverty line. And in even the most developed capitalist countries there are tens of millions of such people.

All experience in the development of monopolistic capitalism, especially the experience of the 1970's, confirms the profound correctness of the Leninist words that "imperialism brings to the working class an unprecedented aggravation of the class struggle, need, unemployment, high prices, the oppression of the trusts, and militarism..." (Poln. sobr. soch., Vol 26, p 283).

Successes of the workers' and general-democratic movements in the struggle against the dictates of the monopolies and in defence of the interests and rights of the workers cannot push into the background those dangers that are associated with trends toward a general rigidity of the social policy of the ruling class and with attempts to overcome the crisis of bourgeois economics and politics by restricting the living standards of the workers and limiting their rights.

The fourth question of the seminar makes it possible to reveal the aggressive essence of imperialism's political strategy. It consists in attempts by the monopolist bourgeois "to fire back" with nuclear weaponry at the immutable course of historical development. The policy of whipping up the arms race—an organic part of the global strategy of imperialism's aggressive circles, which are striving, with a fuss about the imaginary "Soviet military threat," to provide themselves with military and technical superiority.

The feverish promotion of military preparations is the reaction of the capitalist world's aggressive forces to defeat in social battles, to the loss of colonial possessions, to the withdrawal of more and more countries from capitalism, to world socialism's successes and to the growth of the influence of the communists in bourgeois states. Relying upon "a position of strength," imperialism increasingly hopes to hold back the potential for dictating to other countries and peoples that is slipping from its hands.

The attempts of Western reactionary circles to play the "China card" and to create a political and military alliance of Peking's rightist circles with the NATO bloc indicates a striving of imperialism to change the balance of forces in the world in its favor. In its turn, Peking is seeking collaboration with imperialist reaction, pursuing its own expansionist and hegemonistic aims.

All this complicates the international situation and intensifies the danger both of local wars and also of a world military conflict. Nevertheless, our party is convinced that, with the united forces of the socialist countries, peace-loving nonsocialist states, the international working class, and all the forces that defend the cause of peace, it is possible to curb an incendiary war and to avert a world thermonuclear catastrophe. The actual fruits of the policy of reducing tensions and the reaching of agreements that block off certain channels of the arms race testify to this.

During the seminar lesson, the main directions of the CPSU's practical activity to strengthen international security and to develop comprehensive collaboration of the fraternal socialist states should be pointed out. In struggling for peace, the countries of socialist collaboration are maintaining their defensive capability at a level that will be such that potential aggressors, as Comrade L. I. Brezhnev noted, "will not be tempted to try to solve in their favor by force the historic dispute between the two opposing social systems" (Leninskim kursom [By the Leninist Policy], Vol 6, p 169).

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LAXITY IN ADMISSION TO COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERSHIP CRITICIZED

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[Article by Major General V. Soshnev, Chief of the Organizational Section of the Administration for Party Organizational Work of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy: "Leninist Principles of Party Membership"]

[Text] The prestige of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union--the experienced collective leader of our people, the inspirer and organizer of all our victories--is high. Wherever there are Soviet people, everywhere and always they sense its wise leadership and beneficial educating influence. The CPSU's decisions and plans establish the material and technical base for communism, develop and improve social relationships, and shape and educate the new man. The party directly organizes these creative processes and guides them both on a nationwide scale and in individual sections, right on down to the smallest production-work and military collective.

The striving of an ever-greater number of Soviet people, including servicemen of the army and navy, to join the party's ranks and to dedicate their lives to it is completely understandable. More and more applications, which begin with the words, "I ask you to accept...", are being received at party organizations. And a most attentive attitude is given to each such application. This is taught by the party. At all stages of its development it has attached and it is attaching special importance to the admission of fresh blood and to the education of communists, and it sees in this an indispensable condition for an intensification of its role in society. The farther we move ahead, CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Comrade L. I. Brezhnev pointed out at the 25th party congress, and the greater the tasks that the party solves, the greater the care we should show toward filling our ranks with fresh forces from those who have deserved the recognition of the primary party organization and the whole collective, who have been proving themselves actively at production and in social life. These directives are based upon the Leninist teaching about the party. Worked out during the struggle for its creation, they have been developed during the process of building communism and have been consolidated in the Rules of the CPSU.

In our day the importance of the question of membership and of observance of the principles of selection for the party not only has not been lowered but is constantly being raised, for it is primarily by the maturity of communists, their activeness and their political and practical qualities that the fighting efficiency and prestige and degree of influence of the party on the masses and the cohesion of party ranks are determined. There has not been a single congress at which questions of party membership and the admission of members into the party has not been examined. Special attention was paid to it in the decisions of the 23d, 24th and 25th congresses, in Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's speeches and works about building the party, and in the CPSU Central Committee decree, "The Work of Kirgizia's Party Organizations on Admission into the Party and on Educating Candidates for CPSU Membership."

From the basic Leninist statements about the party as a part of the working class, its leading, politically conscious and organizing vanguard, and a higher form of class organization, flows the essence and content of the primary directives that determine who can be a member of the party and what he should be. Among them is the social-class approach to the forming of party ranks and the necessity for regulating the composition thereof, individual selection for the party, the importance of the purposeful education of communists and the instilling of high party qualities in them, and the legitimacy of cleansing party ranks of those who violate the Program and the Rules of the party, who by their conduct compromise the high name of communist. The Leninist requirements made of party membership that were incorporated into the Rules more than 70 years ago—acknowledgement of the party program by each of them, personal participation in the work of one of the party's organizations, and support of it by material means—were later pooled into a well-balanced doctrine about the prerequisites for membership in the party and the principles for filling its ranks. Party organizations are constantly guided by them, providing for a consolidation of their ranks, a rise in their fighting efficiency and intensification of their influence on the masses and on the solution of social and economic tasks.

From the very emergence of our party, its social base has been the proletariat. After the victory of Soviet power, the growth of the party also went preferentially through workers. V. I. Lenin, warning the party against the danger of being clogged up with alien "joiner" elements, pointed out that "we do not need nominal members of the party, they are useless..." (Poln. sobr. soch. [Complete Collected Works], Vol 39, p 224). At the 10th party congress the categories for admissions were established, for each of which the corresponding prerequisites for acceptance, the number of recommendations, the length of party service for those making the recommendations, and the time spent in the candidate probation period were specified. At the 12th congress the party put the accent on the acceptance not simply of workers but precisely of those who are engaged in the sphere of major industrial production.

The 18th party congress laid down a single admission procedure for all. Party ranks began to be filled on a broader social base. With the working class retaining its leading position in the party's composition, more

representatives of the kolkhoz peasantry and the Soviet intelligentsia began to be infused into the party. Of course, the party has also been exercising constant supervision over this process and has tirelessly followed up on its own composition, conscientiously guiding it in such a way that it will meet more completely the requirements of the times. However, the basis for executing Lenin's rule that the party selects for itself only the advanced, the most politically conscious portion of the working class and other representatives of workers, always has been and remains the basis for the accomplishment of these measures, for, as V. I. Lenin pointed out, "only the advanced portion of the working class, only its vanguard, is in a position to lead its country" (Poln. sobr. soch., Vol 39, p 360).

The history of the CPSU has confirmed completely this Leninist conclusion. In reinforcing its ranks with the best representatives of the working class and of the working peasantry and the Soviet intelligentsia, the party at the same time has purified itself of casual elements, all sorts of factional elements and schismatics who have encroached upon its ideological and organizational unity, and all those who did not warrant the high title of communist.

The rule on selecting the most worthy representatives of workers for the CPSU, primarily from the decisive sectors of material production, has not lost its urgency, even at the present time when the level of political consciousness of the masses has risen appreciably and when the social base for strengthening the party's composition has become wider and firmer. Because of this, the 25th congress emphasized the necessity that growth of the party's ranks, on the one hand, provide for an expansion of party influence into all spheres of the life of society, and, on the other, not dilute the party in the masses.

As a matter of fact, the face the working class has changed radically in the Soviet state. Nowadays this class includes tens of millions of educated, technically literate and politically developed people who participate actively in the administration of affairs of state. The face of the peasantry has changed essentially. "The present-day kolkhoz member," said Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "was born on and grew up on the kolkhoz, and his psychology has already been formed on a socialist base. He drives modern equipment. And his educational level and his lifestyle often are little different from the city dweller's." Major changes have also occurred in the composition of the intelligentsia, which has truly become a people's intelligentsia.

Thus, the development, growth and improvement of the qualitative composition of the CPSU currently are being accomplished on the basis of a new historic community of the people—the Soviet people, who are building communism.

It must be said that the problems of CPSU membership and the shaping of its composition are objects of falsification by bourgeois and revisionist ideologues. Certain "critics" assert that the CPSU is a party which, they say, can quickly "change its social base on demand." An increase in the number

of peasants and representatives of the intelligentsia among communists is completely natural under the conditions of socialism, but they are trying to portray the "transformation" of the party as a "repudiation of the doctrine of the proletarian priority in its composition," and "a loss of its proletarian class character." They are thereby demonstrating a graphic example of an antiscientific view and a malicious fabrication in their approach to this pivotal problem of building communism.

In actuality, an expansion and a consolidation of the CPSU's social base, just like those of any other Marxist-Leninist party, are a consistent process of rallying all classes and sectors of society around the party, and an amalgamation thereof on the basis of Marxist-Leninist ideology, for the execution of the purposes and tasks set by the party.

It should be especially noted that the Communist Party was and remains an expression of class interests, mainly of the working class. And nowadays its social base is the working class—society's most advanced and organized force, which emerges as the consistent bearer of communistic ideals and revolutionary traditions. The task of preserving and enlarging the worker nucleus of the party has not lost its urgency. So party organizations, in guiding the directives of the congresses, consistently implement the rule that the leading place in the party's composition be provided in the future for the working class. Suffice it to say that in the 3 years since the 25th congress, 900,000 workers have been accepted into the party and their proportion among those accepted was 58.9 percent. But the point here is not a mechanical increase of this percentage. The party takes care to select for its ranks primarily the best of the best workers of the leading industries, transport and construction. They comprise three-fourths of the workers taken into the CPSU.

In regulating the growth of its ranks, the party considers the peculiarities of each oblast and rayon, the specifics of the labor collectives, and the necessity for intensifying its influence in all sectors of development of the national economy. The admission into the CPSU of advanced representatives of agriculture, workers of leading specialties, and, primarily, equipment operators, livestock raisers, and so on, meets the interests of a strengthening the union of the working class and the kolkhoz peasantry.

Party organizations consider the important role of the intelligentsia in the execution of the scientific and technical revolution and in the solution of questions of building communism. Representatives of the intelligentsia comprise more than one-fourth of those accepted into the CPSU. In so doing, the selection is made primarily from specialists engaged directly in the production sphere, in the development and introduction of new equipment and technology, as well as from workers of science and culture who participate actively in the communist education of workers, who are at the outermost frontiers of the ideological struggle. Right now each fourth or fifth specialist of the country's economy is a communist.

The communist party, which is international in nature, unites peoples in its ranks regardless of their nationality. It is known that V. I. Lenin

came out decisively against the slightest attempt to divide the party into separate sections or groups by the nationality criterion. Therefore, from the first years of the existence of our socialist state, the party has taken the course of strengthening party organizations of the outlying nationality districts by selecting the best representatives for their ranks. Party organizations of the Union and autonomous republics have grown appreciably, and the proportion of communists of the indigenous nationalities in their composition has been increasing all the time. Right now more than 100 nations and nationalities are represented in the party. The party organizations of republics, krays, oblasts and autonomous okrugs are increasingly representative of the nationalities in their composition, which tells about the flourishing of the economies and cultures of the republics, the growth of the workers' political activity, and the process of bringing all nations and nationalities of the USSR closer together.

In the matter of regulating the growth of the party's ranks under present conditions, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's instructions that the party condemn an extraordinary enthusiasm for the admission of new members and that it not tolerate a forcing of its numerical growth is of basic importance. As the result of a stricter individual approach to the selection of new reinforcements, the number accepted in the recent period has been reduced somewhat, and the qualitative composition of those entering is improving, which fully corresponds to the Leninist principle about membership in the party.

The overall setup in our party helps to insure that each person who enters its ranks has become a political fighter in accordance with the call of the heart and the behest of the mind.

General party directives about and trends in shaping the CPSU's ranks are characteristic also for party organizations of the army and navy. They unite in their ranks the best of the best representatives of the military professions that are in the most important areas of combat readiness, who deserve the recognition of the party and of military collectives, having proved faithful to military duty. Suffice it to say that among those who have been accepted in the CPSU, up to 90 percent are rated excellent and are first-class specialists in some districts, groups of forces and fleets.

In acting to regulate the composition of the CPSU's reinforcements, political organs and party organizations show concern about selecting for the party advanced officers, seagoing and shore-based warrant officers, sergeants and master sergeants, and soldiers and sailors and those who excel in exercises, and about strengthening party influence, primarily in subunits that directly solve the tasks of teaching, educating and the performance of duty. Out of the total number accepted this year, in most party organizations almost 80 percent are serving in combat units or aboard ship. The party organizations of missile, aviation and radio-technical subunits that stand combat alert are being strengthened especially appreciably. Attention to strengthening the party organizations and party groups of motorized-rifle, tank and reconnaissance subunits also has been intensified. In the Red Banner Belorussian Military District, the subunits where these party elements are operating now comprise almost 90 percent of

the total number, and in a number of soyedineniya [large units] as a whole, there are party organizations in all the subunits. In the Northern Group of Forces and in many other groups and districts, there are communists in each combat subunit. It is characteristic that the indices of the subunits where party organizations are operating are appreciably higher than in those subunits where there are comparatively few communists.

Major attention is also being paid to those personnel who have a major role in developing new types of equipment and armament—engineers and scientists—the number of communists among whom has risen appreciably. The selection for the CPSU of Komsomol members, who make up 85 percent of the specific composition of the party reinforcement, has been strengthened.

In recent years, especially since the 25th CPSU Congress, political organs have begun to analyze more deeply the qualitative composition of the party recruitment and have exercised their regulatory influence on it. The practical questions connected with this are now being moved up to first-priority questions everywhere. The political administration of the GSFG [Group of Soviet Forces in Germany], for example, keeps these problems under its unremitting monitoring, constantly studies questions of membership in party organizations, listens to the reports of the heads of political organs and guides party organizations in this matter. These questions are first priority also within party organizations. Let's take, for example, the party organization of the motorized-rifle regiment where Major V. Stoyev is one of the party committee members. It is not concerned simply about the numerical increase in its ranks but primarily about the CPSU's ranks being augmented by soldiers of leading specialties who perform duty immediately where the success of combat readiness is forged.

Attention to a deeper study of the practical, moral and political qualities of those who enter the CPSU is being intensified everywhere. The quality of those accepted in most organizations can now be judged not only by the category to which they belong but also according to the combination of political, practical and moral qualities and the lifestyle of each person. Here, let's say, is the party organization where Major N. Kiselev is secretary. All those who are accepted into the party here serve in exemplary fashion, participate actively in the education of soldiers, and are an example in training, service, discipline and observance of the moral norms for socialist quarters, and they exert a beneficial influence on those around them. Since the CPSU Central Committee decree, "Further Improvement of Ideological and Political-Education Work," also requires it, they are supporting everything that is new and advanced and promising, and they are struggling decisively with that which prevents our movement forward. And the successes of the soldiers in carrying out their missions and the rather high socialist commitments that have been adopted is not accidental.

The CPSU Central Committee decree about Kirgizia's party organization indicated that: the matter of admission into the party should be examined, as a rule, at open party meetings, that is, in the view of the collective; this would provide clarification of the opinion of both communists and

those who are not party members about those applying for membership. This basic rule testifies that the party, in shaping its composition, fully considers the opinion of the masses and is deeply interested in it. This practice is being implemented increasingly actively. For a number of districts, up to 80 percent and more of the matters about admission were examined at meetings with the participation of nonmembers of the party. However, where a discussion of the applications of those admitted is restricted to only two or three, the speeches are limited primarily to those of a complimentary nature. In one of the party organizations, a communist, in recommending acceptance of shore-based warrant officer A. Kovalev as a candidate member of the CPSU, justified his presentation this way: "It is possible that candidate probation status can increase his activity." It is clear that such an approach to an examination of applications for admission into the CPSU, such indulgence toward those entering the party, will not help to strengthen party ranks. The party's doors should be open only to the most deserving, for those who are ready to bear the burden of "selfless work for the good of communism" (V. I. Lenin, Poln. sobr. soch., Vol 39, p 224).

A great responsibility for those accepted into the CPSU lies on those who vouch to the party for the comrades who are brought into its ranks. The CPSU Central Committee decree about Kirgizia's party organizations emphasized that "he who has given a recommendation not only is responsible to the party for the one he has recommended but he is also called upon to help his growth in ideology, in practical affairs, and in morals," that is, to help in developing the qualities of a full-fledged party member.

Army and navy political organs and party organizations have begun the practice more often of meeting with communists who have the right to make the recommendations. However, one cannot help but see also that recommendations are given at times to those who do not deserve them, and, if they are given to deserving persons, then sometimes the documents are made out carelessly, and the qualities of the person being recommended are set forth superficially. Some communists still have not realized that a recommendation to the party is not just an honorary right but a great responsibility. Therefore, it is necessary also to be more exacting toward communists in the execution of this statutory rule.

The CPSU Central Committee is focusing attention on raising the responsibility of Komsomol organizations for recommendations for the admission of Komsomol members into the CPSU. The Komsomol was and remains a most important reserve for the party. It is important, therefore, that each Komsomol organization thoroughly and strictly approach the issuance of recommendations in an atmosphere of high exactingness in their discussions at meetings and do not allow an indiscriminate approach to it. Unfortunately, hearings for questions about the issuance of recommendations for Komsomol members for party membership is at times done hastily, and party organizations do not hold Komsomol organizations strictly responsible.

Improvement of the qualitative composition of the party's intake is unthinkable without well-organized conduct of a candidate probation period.

V. I. Lenin attached great importance to it. He proposed acceptance "into the party only after...a 'test' or 'probationary period,' which consists of 'revolutionary work'." He also required that determination be made "in especially minute detail, what the active conduct of the candidate probation should consist of and what the practical prerequisites should be for verifying the fact that the candidate probation period had actually been experienced and does not remain an empty formality...."

Candidate probation is an important step in the selection of individuals. Here, it is essentially different in its purposes and tasks from the selection of nonmembers of the party to be candidates. While in the first case it is a matter of just identifying a worthy person and preparing him for entry into candidate membership, later, during the selection of party candidates for membership in the CPSU, these tasks are expanded. They include acquainting the party candidate more deeply with the Program and the Rules of the CPSU, educating him in the qualities necessary for a political fighter, and checking his practical work in the party organization.

The candidate probation period is, then, on the one hand, a most important means for preparing a man for entry into CPSU membership, and, on the other, a reliable barrier in the path of penetration into the party of persons who are unworthy of membership in it.

Army and navy party organizations are doing much to educate candidates for CPSU membership, extending assistance to them in the study of Leninist teachings about the party, party decisions and documents, and helping them to become aware of the conversion from nonparty status to party membership and to explain the place and role in the party collective. For this purpose various forms and methods are used: lessons in schools for young communists, individual discussions with party candidates, a discussion of their reports at party bureau meetings, and permanent and temporary party missions.

The 25th CPSU Congress directive on increasing the importance of candidate probation requires of political organs and party organizations improvement in work on the ideological hardening of party candidates and a more responsible attitude toward checking the party candidate's possession of those qualities that would enable him to wear proudly the title of member of the Leninist party. "A comprehensive check of the political and practical qualities of the candidate for party membership and of his Marxist-Leninist education must be conducted in all strictness for everyone," states the Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the congress (Materialy XXV s"yezda KPSS [Papers of the 25th CPSU Congress], p 64).

Experience shows that the quality of the party augmentation is higher where due attention is paid to the education of party candidates.

In executing party directives on questions of CPSU membership, the party commissions under the political organs have an important role. All matters pertaining to reception into the party pass through them. The prevention of cases of penetration into party ranks of people who are not worthy

of the high title of communist is highly dependent upon them. In this regard, party commissions under political organs do much, correcting, when necessary, the errors of the various party organizations. For example, the party organization of one of the tank regiments of the Order of Lenin Moscow Military District accepted a candidate for CPSU membership, officer V. Khudenko, although he committed crudeness and was tactless in his relations with subordinates, and he recently was ejected from the CPSU under § 16 of the Rules. And the party commission, in refusing Khudenko's admission into the party, acted correctly.

However, various party commissions also at times do not show the requisite thoroughness in studying the practical and moral qualities of those joining the party. It is this which explains to a great extent cases where, 2-3 months after a person is admitted to the party, it becomes necessary to deal with him in a personnel procedure or even expel him from the CPSU because of gross violation of the regulations and norms of military life.

In itself it is understandable that such errors in party commission work is impermissible. The task consists in further increasing exactingness toward the activity of party commissions for admissions into the CPSU, to insure that their activeness and adherence to principle in solving these questions will be higher.

Army and navy party organizations are reliable helpers to commanders in solving tasks that face units and subunits, and communists everywhere show an example of selfless fulfillment of military duty. All this develops a striving on the part of the best servicemen to link their life with the party, to find among the communists a collective of persons who hold similar views and of comrades. The existing system of party education, the whole life within the party, and the ever-rising level of ideological and political-education work will help the soldier to become a real political fighter.

Experience requires that the practice of selection for the CPSU be analyzed more often in party bureaus, committees and political organs so that at each stage measures will be taken that will raise still higher the prestige of army and navy party organizations, so that the quantitative and qualitative composition of party ranks will enable party influence to cover all elements of army life, all aspects of combat and political readiness, and the discipline and combat readiness of the troops and of navy forces.

To be constantly on guard for the purity of party ranks, to make sure in every possible way that each communist will be an active fighter for the Leninist party, and to direct the efforts of all communists to the successful solution of the missions set before the Armed Forces--these are the most important tasks of party organizations of chasti and of ships.

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POINTS FOR LECTURE ON MILITARY DISCIPLINE OUTLINED

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[Article: "Carry Out Strictly the Requirements for Military Discipline"]

[Excerpts] Two hours are allocated to the study of this topic. It is recommended that the lesson be conducted by the method of a story and a lively detailed conversation. In the course of it, the propagandists are called upon to help the young soldiers, to explain deeply the essence and meaning of firm military discipline in practice and in the combat activity of the army and navy, the behests of V. I. Lenin and requirements of the CPSU and the Soviet Government on the status of discipline and organization of the armed services, and the necessity for unquestioning obedience to commanders and superiors. It is important to orient soldiers and sailors to the drive to further strengthen discipline and order in their subunits and chasty [units] and aboard ship and to persuade listeners to act always and in all cases as required by the oath of allegiance, the regulations and the duty of armed defenders of the motherland.

It is desirable to examine the following questions during the lesson:

1. V. I. Lenin and the CPSU concerning the role and importance of strong military discipline and its requirements on servicemen. 2. Soviet commanders are true sons of the people and transmitters of the party's policies in the army and navy. Unquestioning obedience and thoroughness are the main things in military discipline. 3. Know and carry out precisely the requirements of military regulations and the orders and commands of commanders and superiors.

In considering the importance of the topic being studied, it is desirable to involve the supervisory component of chasty, ships and soyedineniya [large units], and the best trained propagandists to conduct the lessons.

A brief talk should emphasize that young soldiers and sailors are beginning military service during a period when, throughout the whole country,

*Material for political lessons on the topic, "Carry out Unquestioningly the Orders and Commands of Commanders and Superiors and Be a Disciplined Soldier."

preparations for the 110th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birth and the 35th anniversary of our victory in the Great Patriotic War are being promoted. Successfully implementing 25th CPSU Congress decisions, the Soviet people are tirelessly strengthening the economic and defensive might of the motherland and are striving to achieve new successes in fulfilling the plans of the Tenth Five-Year Plan.

The Leninist internal policy of the Soviet state, which is directed toward asserting the principles of peaceful coexistence among countries with different social systems and providing favorable conditions for building communism in the USSR, finds the enthusiastic support and approval of the Soviet people and of all peace-loving forces on earth. However, the process of lessening international tensions encounters the stubborn opposition of imperialism's reactionary circles; this increases military budgets and whips up the arms race in every way. Along with these factors, the ruling bosses of China are following an adventurist policy of aggression and of great-power chauvinism and hegemonism.

Under these circumstances the CPSU and the Soviet Government show constant care to raise the vigilance and combat readiness of the Armed Forces of the USSR. Soviet soldiers, closely united around the Communist Party, its Leninist Central Committee, and the CPSU Central Committee Politburo under Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, are constantly improving martial skills, discipline and the state of organization and, in a unified formation with soldiers of the fraternal socialist countries, are vigilantly standing guard over socialism's achievements.

The party Central Committee decree, "Further Improvement of Ideological and Political-Education Work," has been a powerful stimulus to further growth of the creative initiative and activeness of army and navy personnel. It has become a program document for commanders, political workers and party and Komsomol organizations in the matter of ideologically hardened, comprehensively trained and steadfast defenders of the motherland. "Our duty," says the decree, "is to oppose the subversive political and ideological activity of the class enemy and his malicious slander against socialism with steadfast solidarity, the mighty ideological unity of its ranks, the deep conviction and political vigilance of each Soviet person and his readiness to defend the motherland, and the revolutionary achievements of socialism.... Soviet soldiers should be deeply conscious of their duty to support the peaceful work of the Soviet people and to defend the affairs of peace and socialism."

1. V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on the Role and Importance of Strong Military Discipline and Its Requirements on Servicemen.

Relying upon Leninist teaching about defense of the socialist fatherland, the Communist Party is the organizer of the Soviet motherland's defense. It has the leading and guiding role in solving all the tasks of strengthening the country's defensive capability and improving the Soviet Armed Forces.

The requirements of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government for the constant combat readiness of our forces and all the basic rules about their combat activity, training and education are laid down in the regulations of the Armed Forces of the USSR. The regulations are like a short encyclopedia of military knowledge, a collection of wise precepts and advice, and a collection of rules of conduct for servicemen. These rules are aimed at maintaining in the army and navy firm military law and order and discipline, without which high combat readiness of the Armed Forces is unthinkable.

2. Soviet Commanders Are True Sons of the People, Transmitters of the Party's Policy in the Army and Navy. Unquestioning Obedience and Thoroughness Are the Main Things in Military Discipline.

It should be emphasized, when examining the second question, that under modern conditions, our army and navy are equipped to the highest degree with complicated weaponry. Success in its use depends upon the skillful, coordinated and precise actions of tens, hundreds and, often, thousands of people. The highest state of organization, unquestioning obedience to the commander (or superior) and thoroughness play, in this case, a special role and are the most important requirements of military discipline.

Unlike the discipline of bourgeois armies, Soviet military discipline, as a component part of the discipline of a developed socialist society, is a powerful resource for the unity and class cohesion of our servicemen. Soviet soldiers are obedient to commanders and superiors and are conscious of the social importance and necessity for thoroughness. Our discipline is based, as is known, not on fear of punishment and coercion but on high political consciousness, on the serviceman's deep understanding of his duty. Blind submission and mechanized obedience are alien to it. Our discipline does not suppress but, on the contrary, it develops the personality of the soldier and it opens up the way for him to valor, nobility, high honor and heroic deeds.

Our army and navy are built upon unquestioning and rigorous subordination from top to bottom, and this is incorporated legally in the regulations. This structure of the military organism, where junior personnel and subordinates are obligated to carry out quickly and precisely the orders and instructions of senior personnel, imparts to that organism a high and flexible state of organization, it facilitates the control of subunits, battalions and ships in battle, and it provides for successful combat training and service in peacetime.

The most important principle in building the Soviet Armed Forces is unity of command. This principle means that the party and the government have vested in the commander of a company, ship, or subunit, absolutely complete responsibility for the training, education, and combat activity of the collective entrusted to him. So that the commander will be able to carry out the complex missions assigned to him, he has been endowed with the right to give orders and instructions and to require of subordinates that they be carried out unquestioningly. Soviet soldiers see in a commander's order a behest of the motherland and they carry it out, not only by reason of duty

but also because of conviction. And this is not accidental. They well know that the officers corps comprises the backbone of our army and navy. Soviet officers are loyal sons of the party and the people. They have proved many times, both in peacetime and in the years of severe military experience, their devotion to the socialist motherland. For selflessness and heroism on the fields of battle of the Great Patriotic War, hundreds of thousands of officers have received combat awards, and the title Hero of the Soviet Union has been conferred on thousands of them. And in peacetime many of them have been awarded orders and medals.

The education of subordinates in the spirit of devotion to their motherland, to their people, and to the ideals of the Communist Party has been entrusted to the officers. They teach subordinates the art of waging modern battle, educate them in conscious military discipline, and supervise the diverse activity of military collectives, thereby helping to raise the combat readiness of the army and navy. All the service of soldiers and sailors occurs under the supervision of the officer. He directs the main effort toward implementing firmly and unswervingly the Communist Party's policy in the Armed Forces.

A Soviet officer is in sole command. In order to carry out his obligations, he has been granted great rights. A person who is in sole command is responsible for personally making decisions on all questions that arise. Showing high exactingness toward subordinates, the commander proceeds not from his own personal motives but from the interests of the motherland. In confirmation of what he says, the supervisor of the lesson should acquaint the listeners with articles 5-7 of the Disciplinary Regulations, where it is said, in particular, that the interests of the motherland's defense obligate the commander (or the superior) to decisively and firmly require observance of military discipline and order and not to let one breach by a subordinate pass without action.

3. Know and Carry Out the Requirements of Military Regulations and the Orders and Commands of Commanders and Superiors

In explaining the third question of the subject, it is important that the propagandist bring listeners to the conclusion that firm knowledge and precise fulfillment of the requirements of military regulations and the orders and commands of commanders and superiors are the duty and responsibility of all Soviet soldiers. CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and USSR Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov pointed out: "In the modern era, because of the great and truly revolutionary transformations in military affairs and the equipping of the army and navy with new equipment and weaponry, with the appearance of new methods for conducting combat actions and with changes in the structure of military life, the importance of military discipline has grown still more. Nowadays the Armed Forces' need for discipline has truly been driven, according to Vladimir Il'ich Lenin's expression, to the highest limits."

The USSR's Armed Forces, in the era of developed socialism, are the armed forces of the whole state, it is a favored offspring of the multinationality

Soviet people. The army and navy are not only a school in combat skills but also a good school for ideological and physical hardening and a high state of discipline and organization and a living embodiment of socialist internationalism. The CPSU Central Committee decree, "Further Improvement of Ideological and Political-Education Work," emphasizes the necessity for augmenting the glorious traditions of the army and navy, service in which is a splendid school of labor and military training, moral purity and manliness, and patriotism and comradeship. The duty of the Armed Forces of the USSR to the people, as the USSR Constitution declares, is to reliably defend the socialist fatherland and to be combat ready constantly, which guarantees a rapid rebuff to any aggressor. And Soviet soldiers are faithful to this duty.

It is recommended that listeners, /during the hours for independent preparation, [boldface]/ study the work of V. I. Lenin, "Vse na bor'bu s Denikinym!" [Everyone to the Struggle with Denikin!] (Poln. sobr. soch., Vol 31, pp 56-57); the report of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, "Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Party's Immediate Tasks in the Area of Domestic and Foreign Policy" (Materialy XXV s'yezda KPSS, pp 75-76 and 83); the Constitution (the Basic Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (articles 31-32 and 59-65); and the CPSU Central Committee decree, "Further Improvement of Ideological and Political-Education Work" (PRAVDA, 1979, 6 May).

During training and during lesson on the subject, it is desirable to show the motion-picture films, "Zheleznyy potok" [The Iron Stream], "Optimisticheskaya tragediya" [An Optimistic Tragedy], "Ofitsery" [Officers] and "Ballada o soldate" [A Ballad about a Soldier] and the historical documentary films, "Naroda vernyy syny" [Loyal Sons of the People], "Svyashchennyy gold" [A Sacred Duty], and "Sluzhim Sovetskomy Soyuzu" [We Serve the Soviet Union].

It is also desirable to organize meetings and conversations of young soldiers and sailors with veterans of the chast', with those rated excellent in combat and political readiness, and with advanced and disciplined soldiers.

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WARTIME ROLE OF SUBMARINES DISCUSSED

Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian No 9, Sep 79 signed to press 5 Sep 79
pp 81-87

[Article by Vice Adm K. Stalbo, Doctor of Naval Sciences, Professor, Honored Scientist of the RSFSR and USSR State Prize Laureate: "Development of Views on Submarine Forces"]

[Text] The role and place of submarines in the fleets of all naval powers, and chiefly the great naval powers, were determined precisely and completely in the postwar period and particularly with the development of the scientific-technological revolution. It is now impossible to find doubts in a single military doctrine concerning the high combat capabilities of submarine forces in accomplishing many missions not only in contemporary armed warfare at sea, but even in the war as a whole.

Submarines have become a very important part of strategic nuclear arms. They have not lost their importance as the primary arm in the struggle against surface warships and transports and they make up a mandatory and very effective part of ASW forces. Thanks to their specific nature and primarily their concealment and great striking force, submarines are an important means of winning and maintaining sea supremacy.

There is a very obvious opportunity for using submarines for transport purposes and for helping to perform work involving research of the World Ocean and exploitation of its resources.

The rapid growth in submarines' tactical and technical characteristics and their general recognition as the most universal and primary attack forces of fleets of the great powers are connected with the introduction of atomic propulsion aboard these ships and their outfitting with various missiles, and strategic ballistic missiles above all. There is no question that scientific research contributed to a revelation of the capabilities contained in submarines. The importance of its role is obvious in development of systems of armaments and rational methods of their employment.

It should be noted that when debates were held in a number of countries after the war under the influence of the appearance of nuclear weapons with regard to the advisability of constructing particular ships (this concerned

aircraft carriers in particular) or developing naval aviation, submarines remained outside the subjects of discussion and firmly held a place as an inalienable part of the naval forces.

Submarines now represent a very important component of the naval power of states. The concept of employment of submarine forces is now completely free of any layers of doubts or vagueness. It bears traits of a scientifically substantiated and rational system of views. At the same time, there is probably no one element of the doctrine which experienced so many difficulties and contradictory interpretations along its development path as the theory of construction and employment of submarines in the overall system of naval armaments of states. An examination of the development of views on submarine forces is of considerable interest in this regard.

It is advisable to begin a study of this process with the period of preparation of naval armament systems in the period between the Russo-Japanese War and World War I. We will note that the first mention of submarines in history is encountered in 1620 in England and in 1724 in Russia, but such ships were not viewed as a real force for a long period of time. Their creation and development was no more than the concern of isolated enthusiasts.¹

The creation of submarines which more or less met the requirements of modern times falls in the first decade of the 20th century.

There was a total of 17 submarines in commission in the fleets of Russia, Japan, the United States, and Germany by the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War.² At that time there naturally was no theory of their employment in armed warfare at sea. The experience of employing Russian submarines in the war was limited to patrolling in friendly coastal areas and performing reconnaissance. No scientific development involving the use of submarines was carried on.

There were around 210 submarines³ in the navies of England, Russia, France, Japan, Germany, and the United States by the beginning of World War I, while there were 390 surface warships of the first rank (less Japan).⁴ Around 100 submarines were being built.

The low rates of submarine construction in Russia, Japan, and the United States remained the same throughout all of World War I. Only in Germany did a significant increase in the number of submarines built begin in the latter half of the war: 1915--52 units; 1916--106; 1917--87; 1918--86. A total of 344 submarines were commissioned here from 1915 up until November 1918 and 226 were in various stages of construction. Losses comprised 178 units.

England was in second place in the intensity of submarine construction in the war years (137 units), and Russia was in third place (43 submarines). A total of 30 submarines was built in France in the war years.

Russia was in last place among all countries participating in World War I.⁵ By the beginning of the war the fleet had only 15 submarines. But if we take the sum and the number of submarines built during combat operations, it will be seen that four European powers had a grand total of around 730 submarines in their fleets—unquestionably a large figure for that time. The allies (Russia, England, and France) "passed through their fleets" a lesser number of submarines (356) with common efforts than Germany alone (372). It was for this reason that the German Navy received the primary experience in employing submarine forces in World War I. It is generally known that this involved the struggle on ocean lines of communication, during which submarines destroyed over 11 million gross register tonnage, or around 85 percent of all tonnage sunk.

Submarines of the warring sides also operated successfully against warships (192 units were sunk, including 12 battleships, 23 cruisers, 39 destroyers, and 30 submarines).

/The experience of World War I showed that submarine forces were a powerful and universal ocean-going means of armed warfare at sea./ [Passage in slant-lines in italics]

Another important result of submarine combat activities was the appearance of antisubmarine ships and, on the whole, a system of combating submarines which comprised one of the chief directions in fleet construction and in the development of naval art.

Under conditions of a general stagnation in military operations on the land and at sea in World War I, which led to no very decisive results, only operations of the submarines were able to create a number of crisis situations of great importance.⁶ This allows a consideration of the experience of submarine employment in World War I as practically exhaustive for their entire subsequent development as a system of armaments intended for the destruction of surface targets.

This experience was not used, however, nor did it serve as a stimulus for development of submarine forces in the interwar period. Construction of a surface fleet with a leading role played by large, primarily gun-firing ships, remained the chief trend in the development of fleets of capitalist countries. Antisubmarine forces also did not receive proper development.

Here I would like to direct attention to the fact that the experience of employing large gun-firing ships in the Russo-Japanese War unquestionably contributed to the fact that just 9 years later, by the beginning of World War I, large squadrons of battleships and cruisers armed with guns were operating as part of the fleets. At the same time, the more impressive results of submarine combat actions in World War I did not have the necessary effect, or an effect adequate to their significance, on the development of important provisions of naval doctrines in all capitalist countries.

In this regard the balance of navies of capitalist countries remained tilted toward surface forces by 1939--the beginning of World War II. The experience of World War I, which showed the impossibility of accomplishing missions at sea with forces of large surface ships alone, proved insufficient for bourgeois military science. Still another world war was required, and it demonstrated the total unsuitability of battleships and reaffirmed the special capabilities of submarines and aircraft in attaining the objectives of armed warfare at sea.

With regard to submarines, there was a total of 437 of them in the navies of the United States, England, France, Italy, Japan, and Germany in 1939⁷, i.e., not many more than before World War I.

It is typical that Germany, which had the most extensive and significant experience in employing submarines during World War I, had only 57 submarines. It is true that their construction was limited by provisions of the Versailles Peace Treaty, but they were quite freely violated by fascist Germany, which created powerful ground forces and aviation despite the limitations. An underestimation or lack of understanding of the importance of submarines obviously stopped the German command from creating submarine forces appropriate to the situation. It was only during the war that fascist Germany again turned to submarines and to the idea itself of submarine warfare against ocean shipping by building over 1,100 submarines. These were the chief means for cutting Anglo-American lines of communication in the Atlantic and they shared the palm with aviation in the Mediterranean.

While England, the United States, and France followed in the rut of their traditions by relying on powerful surface fleets, Germany did this despite its own experience of employing submarines, which was practically the extent of its experience.

It should thus be noted that the fleets of capitalist countries entered World War II without having the necessary physical base or theoretical principles recognized by military doctrines for employing submarine forces in armed warfare at sea which corresponded to their objective operational and strategic capabilities revealed during the last world war.

Just what are the reasons for bourgeois military doctrines to ignore the experience of employing submarines? There are several.

The basic reason obviously was the difficulty of perceiving something new under conditions of a dominance of views on use of something old. What told here to the full extent was both a struggle of the new against the old and the difficulty of developing something new generated in the depths of traditional concepts and ideas. The dialectics of this process are not new and this example serves as one further illustration of the development of phenomena and theories.

For centuries capitalist countries saw in surface ships the alpha and omega of those forces needed to conquer colonies, augment them, and defend them. For

example, Holland, England, Spain, and Portugal in their time attained grandeur thanks to fleets represented by surface forces. These fleets embodied the height of capabilities of the struggle for sea supremacy. It was of course difficult for them to stand aside and give up the positions won over the course of history.

For a long while surface forces also had the priority in resolving problems of foreign policy and in implementing the concept of naval presence, which continues to be an important tool of pressure on a weak partner even in our days.

The weakness of bourgeois military science obviously was an important reason. Prior to World War II it was not capable of properly evaluating capabilities of the arms or of analyzing the past war's experience and elaborating scientific principles of balancing their fleets as applied to new missions and a new situation. We know that where science proves to be groundless, preeminence automatically is given to bias and subjectivism. Therefore, the subjective factor was one of the factors which did not allow a proper understanding or use of the abundant experience of employing submarines in World War I by the beginning of World War II. It was to a significant extent because of this that the concept of submarine forces did not have such a carefully developed and generally recognized theory of their employment on the path of its development as was the case with respect to surface ships.

There were many enemies of submarines, blind emulators of previously formulated postulates about their limited combat capabilities, and adherents of Mahan methods of winning sea supremacy among the leaders of the British, French, Japanese, and American fleets, which had no experience of employing submarines in major operations or campaigns of a war. They could not and did not wish to consider the experience of submarine employment in World War I.

The subjective factor showed up in the worst form in this process of an evaluation of the arms of bourgeois navies. It always is inevitable in making decisions in the field of military organizational development without a proper reliance on science, without an understanding of the perspective, and without a consideration of the experience of history, which was especially typical of the British Admiralty.

By ignoring the importance of submarine forces, British naval doctrine proved to be in a very serious situation not only because it determined large surface ships to be the chief force of the fleet, but also because it did not substantiate at all the need for development of antisubmarine forces. The conservatism of British naval thinking showed up especially vividly in this matter. Having already been placed on the verge of catastrophe once, when the Kaiser's submarines interrupted the nation's sea routes, England again did not have the antisubmarine forces it required on entering World War II. The fact is that they were even more necessary than during the last world war. Great Britain again turned for assistance to the United States, which cost no small territorial losses.⁹

An underestimation of the experience in employing submarines in World War I was to a certain extent also a result of the fact that in the entire brief history of the development of views on the conduct of submarine warfare and official recognition of the capabilities of submarines, the decisions in these matters were prepared and made by people who made the idea of sea supremacy achieved through the battle of line forces into a fetish. Especially favorable conditions were created here for the development of departmental conservatism and the dominance of an ideology built on the eternal nature and unchangeability of the laws of armed warfare at sea formulated at one time with regard to ships.

The fate of submarine forces essentially was in the hands of followers of traditional paths of development of naval force such as Admiral Jellicoe, Admiral Raeder, and practically all Japanese naval leaders. And science also was "moved" by the enemies of submarines--Groos, Corbett, Wegener, and others.

The subjectivism in this matter led to a significant extent to the fact that the capabilities of the new forces were measured using old criteria. No consideration was given to the fact that recognition of submarines as a real and promising force involved a need to comprehend and understand not only weapons systems fundamentally different from the previous systems, but also the very content of naval warfare under new conditions. The process of recognizing submarines has much in common here with the difficult process of recognizing aviation as a naval arm.

There a large number of problems also were resolved in no simple manner and not without a struggle. Let's take just the following fact: The positive feature of aviation, which was capable of achieving the objective of a battle in a short period of time with one blow, was classified as a deficiency allegedly consisting of its incapability for exerting lengthy pressure against the enemy.

Another reason which prevented naval powers of the West to evaluate the importance of submarines opportunely was a unique inertia in evaluating the importance of naval arms.

It is generally known that the development of armament systems has two basic forms: evolutionary and revolutionary--qualitatively abrupt leaps accomplished in relatively short historical time periods.

Bourgeois military theorists and practitioners always gave preference to the evolutionary path in the period before the scientific-technical revolution. It could be supported by the existing scientific-production shipbuilding base and by traditional forms of industrial cooperation. It required no detailed scientific substantiation under fundamentally new criteria, and it fit within the channel of customary decisions and the assimilated methods for implementing them. And finally, it was devoid of risk, including financial risk, which was especially important for the private companies and concerns in charge of shipyards and which consequently influenced technical policy and the building of fleets. This began to be felt most noticeably during the period of the appearance of military-industrial complexes capable even of influencing state policy.

The building of surface ships, which remained the only direction in the building of fleets right up until the 20th century, was such an evolutionary form in the development of fleets, with a thousand years of history and traditions just as old. It therefore acquired special inertia and as history shows, a minimum number and sometimes only isolated successes of surface ships were sufficient to maintain that inertia, while to overcome it required extraordinary efforts and a lengthy time period.

Returning to the experience of employing surface gunfiring ships in the Russo-Japanese War, it can be seen that all naval theorists hastened to use just one aspect--the Japanese experience. Once again they unconditionally declared battleships to be the backbone of fleets and the personification of their might. No one sought possible new paths of development of fleets prior to World War I, although they already existed objectively and soon appeared.

The one-sided analysis of the Russo-Japanese War's experience and its being made into a fetish was the most convenient and customary tool for naval theorists and practitioners of that time in resolving key issues of trends in fleet development. None of the naval specialists were able to rise to the level of understanding that it was not Japanese surface ships which won victory over the Russian Japanese surface ships which won victory over the Russian Navy in the Russo-Japanese War. The reasons for the defeat of the Czarist regime in Russia had to be seen primarily in the sphere of politics.

An examination of the process of recognizing submarine forces as a certain dominant idea in the system of naval armaments in Germany merits special attention.¹⁰ This issue is of interest because it was Germany which was the country where the largest submarine fleet was created and where the experience of its combat operations demonstrated its great capabilities with sufficient persuasiveness.

In speaking of the experience of employing German submarines in World War I, we must note above all the fact that they proved the only possible means for achieving abrupt turning points throughout the war. At a certain stage in the war the Germans saw no other weapon for victory over the British.

Military leaders at all echelons gradually became adherents of these views. Hindenburg wrote: "...and thus, the submarine war should have decided the course of the war. And even more so--at the beginning of 1917 this was the only means which we could employ to end the war victoriously."¹¹

Germany took the path of submarine warfare, but steps taken to support it were extremely insufficient. The shipbuilding industry just was not able to receive only the 69,000 persons necessary for work at the yards from an army numbering 14 million. In addition to purely objective reasons involving the course of war in land theaters, the German "infantryism" was felt here especially. It was the constant companion of the development of this country's armed forces under the pressure of infantry generals.

An analysis of decisions by the German leadership for building a fleet prior to World War II shows that they were aimed at creating a surface fleet. It is generally known that the provisions of the Versailles Treaty, which limited Germany's right to have a strong navy, were violated unilaterally after Hitler's arrival in power. By agreement with England on 18 June 1935 envisaged the creation primarily of a surface fleet by the beginning of a possible war (1944, according to German plans). It was planned to build 26 large surface ships and only 126 submarines.¹² Submarines thus were given a secondary place. When world war began in 1939, only 15 German submarines could operate at sea. Here is where the numerous theoretical elaborations of the interwar period told. The apologists of line fleets intentionally distorted historical experience and they drew conclusions both in the face of facts and of common sense. Matters even went to the absurd. For example, on the basis of experience of warfare on ocean lines of communication in World War I, the well-known German naval theorist Groos drew a conclusion as to the advantages of surface ships in this form of operations while, as is generally known, they actually were unsuitable for this. With regard to the long term, Groos gave a larger place to the surface cruiser than to a submarine in a future war.

Wegener, another German theorist, relegated "submarine weapons" to a secondary role, admitting the possibility of their use where powerful surface forces were lacking. Admiral Raeder, who was preparing the fleet for war, underestimated the role of submarines and bowed to battleships.

Even submariner Doenitz, later the commander in chief of the German Navy, admitting that "the world war showed the importance of the submarine in the war against commerce," regarded submarines as a weapon of second-class powers which "have no other means for attacking sea lines of communication of a stronger naval power."¹³

His demand that 300 submarines be built for the war against England was a forced step in connection with the impossibility of the rapid creation of armadas of battleships and cruisers and did not stem from an estimate of the objectively existing high combat qualities of this naval arm.¹⁴

It is completely clear that "under the pressure" of such "authorities" in German Navy doctrines, the concept of employment of submarine forces just did not find proper expression in the prewar period despite the most extensive experience in this matter.

Germany turned to submarines twice. In World War I this occurred accidentally to a significant extent in a search for a step capable of countering the British surface blockade.

The matter was resolved differently in World War II. They recalled the experience of World War I, when the exceptional capabilities of submarines were revealed in combat operations against England. Adherents of the development of submarine forces, which were gathering strength, also exerted a certain influence.

After the seizure of Norway, Germany's surface fleet actually was idle. The British Navy continued its domination. Under these conditions even Raeder shifted over to the camp of the submariners. Germany began feverishly to create a powerful submarine fleet. Each month, 20, 30, and even 35 submarines were being built here.

The considerable expansion of the material base of armed warfare in the underwater environment made it necessary to develop a theory on the methods of submarine operations, and such a theory was developed in Germany. It was based primarily on the struggle against enemy shipping and unrestricted submarine warfare. It must be noted that its creation was accompanied by a lengthy struggle. Raeder, commander in chief of the German Navy, was retired in 1943 despite his apparent reorientation. Doenitz took his place.

The theories of Groos and Wegener, apologists of a surface fleet, gradually were replaced in the German press by ideas of submarine adherents Spindler and Assman, who attempted to define their role and place in the war against England in the system of submarine blockade of this state.

Spindler was a convinced adherent of the view that victory in the war against England would come from strikes against British SLOC by submarine forces after sufficient areas had been won in the East capable of providing Hitler's war machine with the necessary resources. Assman considered submarines to be the chief weapon in Germany's economic war against England.

The principles in the concept of employing submarine forces in war formulated by these scholars far from corresponded to the situation. For example, problems of supporting submarines during their operations in oceans were not examined at all. After departure from bases, submarines were left to their own resources. They therefore gradually began to give way to the overall capabilities of rapidly developing antisubmarine defense of the Allies and suffered heavy losses.

The strategy of employing submarines for "total" destruction of enemy tonnage regardless of the transports' load or direction of movement was erroneous.

Despite this, World War II provided new, enormous opportunities for assessing the role and importance of submarine forces and for developing the concept of their employment in warfare. Submarines of Germany and the United States sank 320 warships and over 4,000 transports with a total displacement of over 20 million tons.

A total of 1,669 submarines were built in the war years, and 1,123 were lost.

In the postwar period, however, only the Soviet Union was able to evaluate submarine forces thoroughly and correctly. With regard to capitalist powers, and the traditional naval powers above all, they only turned specifically to submarines after the development of atomic power engineering, and primarily to platforms for strategic ballistic missiles, without letting up in the arms race for a single day. The navies of the United States,

England, and France have 49 such submarines. More attention now has begun to be given to the creation of multipurpose nuclear-powered submarines. But nuclear-powered submarines are very complex and costly weapons. Therefore only major powers such as the United States can have them in the optimum numbers. The other western countries are not building nuclear-powered submarines, and only England and France have a limited number of such ships.

Contemporary naval rivalry is concentrated to a significant extent in the sphere of building nuclear-powered submarines. The number of strategic submarines is regulated by international agreements.

The very rapid development of submarines made the creation of large, all-arms ASW forces into the most important direction in the building of modern fleets.

We analyzed the paths of development of views on the employment of submarines as applied to events which occurred in the Atlantic. It was here that the primary operations of submarine forces unfolded. Over 80 percent of all submarines lost (941 out of 1,123) were sunk in waters of the Atlantic and adjoining seas. Over 70 percent of the submarines (1,337 out of 1,669) were built for operations in the Atlantic. It was the system of naval opposition of Germany and England which was the environment in which views on the employment of submarine forces were formed in the two world wars.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopediya" (Soviet Military Encyclopedia). Vol. 6. Voenizdat, 1978, p. 376.
2. Moiseyev, S.P. "Spisok korabley russkogo parovogo i bronenosnogo flota" (List of Ships of the Russian Steam-Powered and Armorclad Fleet). Voenizdat, 1948.
3. "Floty velikikh derzhav" (Fleets of the Great Powers). Sankt Peterburg 1914, p.38.
4. Gorshkov, S.G. "Morskaya moshch' gosudarstva" (Sea Power of the State) Voenizdat, 1976, pp. 118, 119.
5. Ibid, p. 158.
6. Ibid, p. 165-166.
7. Ibid, pp. 175, 185.
8. The Soviet Union was an exception. Our prewar theory and doctrine regarded submarines as the most important fleet arm. In this connection the primary direction of its development was accelerated construction of submarines as an important means for defending the maritime boundaries of our state. By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War the Soviet Union had 218 submarines. This was more than in the fleet of any other country participating in World War II or in the fleets of England, France, and the United States together (202).

9. In 1941 England was forced to transfer its military and air bases on Newfoundland, the Bermudas, the Bahamas, the islands of Antigua and Saint Lucia, British Guiana, and the islands of Jamaica and Trinidad to the United States for 99 years in exchange for 50 old American destroyers.
10. It was only in 1908 that the first submarine was commissioned in the German Navy.
11. "Vospominaniya gindenburga" (The Hindenburg Memoirs). Petrograd, "Mysl'", 1922, p. 40.
12. Afuzov, V. "Doktriny germanskogo flota" (German Navy Doctrines). Voenizdat, 1958, p. 154.
13. Ibid, p. 160.
14. After the war Doenitz stated that Germany should have had at least 1,000 submarines by the time it began.

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